International sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022 are working—contrary to what the Kremlin and its network of agents of influence work hard to make us believe.
The sanctions have hobbled the Russian economy and limited its ability to wage its war of conquest. The coalition of democratic states, with the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States playing a prominent role, has materially burdened Russia: its oil exports have been forced into more expensive, opaque and risky channels, transaction costs have risen sharply, and military-related procurement has been restricted.
Yet in the fifth year of its genocidal war, Russia continues to generate eye-watering profits from selling its energy resources, while still obtaining the parts and tools needed to keep its war machine running. Many companies from the EU, the United States and the United Kingdom continue to profit from doing business with Russia, and some governments lobby on their behalf during sanctions negotiations to protect national tax revenue. While business carries on as usual, Russia persists in the deliberate killing of civilians and the destruction of civilian property and infrastructure.
This approach must change.
Structuring sanctions into “packages” entails protracted negotiations, affording Russia and its partners ample time to anticipate, adapt to and influence decision-making. Once a package is adopted, Russia adeptly violates and circumvents the measures, knowing that the responsible authorities cannot track and forestall such conduct in real time.
The strategy underpinning the sanctions process must therefore be rethought, and both the general procedural framework and the approach in priority sectors must be improved.
¹ Russia’s federal oil-and-gas budget revenue in 2025 was roughly EUR 96 billion, down about 24% year-on-year.
² Russian X-101 cruise missiles and Geran-2 strike drones that struck residential buildings in Kyiv in May 2026 were found to contain Western-made electronic components.